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The Impact of the Borg-Warner Case
on Collective Bargaining
In its 1958 decision in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., the United States Supreme Court stated for the first
time the ule that "it is lawful to insist upon matters within
the scope of mandatory bargaining and unlawful to insist
upon matters without." The Court thus created a new "vol-
untary" category of bargaining subjects. The author of this
Note examines the origin of this rule and the effect that it
may have upon collective bargaining.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the stated objectives of the National Labor Relations Act
is to encourage "the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing."1 The act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees,2 and defines collective bargaining as:
[The performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet . . .and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment ... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.... 
These provisions were the focal point of the Supreme Court deci-
sion in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.4
In Borg-Warner the employer had insisted to the point of im-
passe, in the face of union refusal, that the collective bargaining
contract contain a "ballot clause" which would have allowed the
employees to cast a secret, pre-strike, advisory vote on whether the
union should go on strike or accept the employer's last offer.5 The
1. Labor Management Relations Act § 1, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1952).
2. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.§ 158(a) (5) (1952).
8. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158(d) (1952).
4. 856 U.S. 842 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as Borg-Warner].
5. Borg-Warner also dealt with the employer's insistence upon a "recognition"
clause which excluded, as a party to the collective bargaining contract, the international
union that had been certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees
by the NLR1. This Note will not examine the recognition clause since the em-
ployer's insistence upon it was undoubtedly an unfair labor practice. See 356 U.S.
at 362 (dissenting opinion). See also, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 801 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1937); NLRB v. Deena Artvare, Inc., 198 F.2d 645
(6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953); NLRB3 v. Louisville Ref. Co.,
102 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 568 (1939).
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question was whether or not the employer's insistence on the bal-
lot clause constituted an unfair labor practice. The National Labor
Relations Board determined, two members dissenting, that the
ballot clause was not a subject which the statute required bargain-
ing about, and that by insisting upon it the employer had failed, in
violation of the act, to bargain with the union. The court of appeals
refused to enforce the Board's order concerning the ballot clause.7
On certiorari, the Supreme Court accepted the Board's position and
stated the applicable rule as: "[lt is lawful to insist upon matters
within the scope of mandatory bargaining and unlawful to insist
upon matters without .... "8 The Court then held that the ballot
clause is not a subject within the statutory definition of collective
bargaining.9 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the employer's in-
sistence on the strike ballot constituted a refusal to bargain about
those subjects that are within the scope of mandatory bargaining,
which was an unfair labor practice.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss (1) the origin of the rule
that "it is lawful to insist upon matters within the scope of manda-
tory bargaining and unlawful to insist upon matters without," and
(2) the effects this rule may have upon the collective bargaining
relationship.
II. TBE Borg-Warner RuLE: Is OmoIN
The Court in Borg-Warner stated the above rule as if it were one
of long standing about which there would be no argument. 10 How-
ever, Borg-Warner is the first Supreme Court statement of the rule;
it evoked a strong dissent;' and just two months before Borg-
6. 113 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1955). The disienters were Farmer, who was then chair-
man, and Leedom, who is now chairman.
7. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1950).
8. 356 U.S. at 349.
9. Four Justices dissented from the opinion. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote the dis-
senting opinion joined by Justices Clark and Whittaker. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
inserted a separate opinion which stated in part:
He [Mr. Justice Frankfurter] agrees with the views of Mr. Justice Harlan re-
garding the 'ballot' clause. The subject matter of that clause is not so clearly
outside the reasonable range of industrial bargaining as to establish a refusal to
bargain in good faith, and is not prohibited simply because not deemed to be
within the rather vague scope of the obligatory provisions of § 8(d).
Id. at 351.
10. The Court prefaced its statement of the rule with the word "since" and did
not cite any authority to support the rule.
11. See note 9, supra. Mr. Justice Harlan stated in dissent that the rule the
Court used does not conform with the legislative history of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, nor the earlier case of NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 395 (1952). At the same time he questioned, but accepted, the Court's con-
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Warner, two members of the NLRB stated that the Board had no
authority to use the rule.12 Further, the legislative history of the
Labor Management Relations Act does not support the rule and
at least one Supreme Court decision seems to preclude its use. On
the other hand, the rule does have support in several lower court
decisions; and an argument can be made that necessities of labor-
management relations and the general policy of the act provide the
foundation for adoption of the rule.
Lower court decisions that support the rule
At least two lower court cases support the rule as it was applied
in Borg-Warner. In the first case, NLRB v. Dalton Tel. Co.,13 the
court held that the employer had committed an unfair labor prac-
tice by imposing the requirement that the union register under a
state statute so as to be amenable to suit in the state courts as a
condition precedent to signing the collective bargaining contract.
The court stated:
Respondent cannot legally make its agreement depend upon an improper
condition.. .. There are certain things about which the parties may
bargain or negotiate, but which cannot be insisted upon as a condition
precedent to the making of a contract.1 4
However, the court did not cite any authority for this principle."5
The second case that directly supports the rule is NLRB v. Darl-
ington Veneer Co.,'6 where the employer insisted upon a provision
clusion that the strike ballot does not come within the statutory definition of
collective bargaining.
12. Economy Stores, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 41 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1958). Chair-
man Leedom, who dissented in Borg-Warner, and Member Bean argue that "no
persuasive authority exists either in the statute or in court precedent for finding
that good faith.advancement of such a proposal [union liability clause] is unlawful."
41 L.R.R.M. at 1405.
13. 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951).
14. Id. at 812.
15. The Court did cite Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), for
the proposition that " . . . the bargaining rights created by the National Labor
Relations Act may not be conditioned upon compliance with state registration
laws." 187 F.2d at 812. The Hill case concerned a Florida statute that tended to
limit the freedom of workers in the selection of bargaining representatives in viola-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act. But the Hill case offers no support for
the rule as applied in Dalton.
The court in Dalton may not have needed to use the Borg-Warner rule. In Dal-
ton, the Board had found that the employer had refused to bargain in good faith on
the basis that he had raised the registration requirement as a condition precedent
to the signing of the contract after the parties had come to agreement on the
terms of the contract. This, and the rule of the Hill case formed sufflcient basis
for the holding and the Borg-Warner rule was therefore unnecessary to the decision
of the case.
16. 236 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1956). See also, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
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for the automatic nullification of the collective bargaining contract
should checkoff authorizations fall below fifty per cent of the
employees, and a provision requiring ratification of the collective
bargaining contract by the employees. The court stated that the
company was attempting to bargain about matters outside the
scope of wages, hours or conditions of employment; that the in-
sistence upon these terms was so unreasonable as to justify a find-
ing of a failure to bargain in good faith; 17 and that "it is well set-
tled that an employer may not insist upon including as a condition
of the contract terms having no relation to the statutory duty to
bargain."' As authority for the last statement the court cited a
group of cases which are not directly in point. For example, the
court cited NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co.'" In Pecheur, the em-
ployer refused to bargain unless the union abandoned its strike.
The court, while holding the employer's action to be a violation
of the duty to bargain collectively, stated:
[Ain employer may not condition his statutory obligation to bargain
collectively upon an abandonment of a strike. This is but one phase of
the fundamental rule that generally an employer may not lawfully de-
mand, as a condition precedent to the performance of his statutory duty,
an abandonment by employees of protected, concerted activities or a
surrender of rights bestowed by the Act.20
The condition demanded by the employer in Pecheur would have
resulted in an abridgment of the employees' right to strike. It is
absolutely necessary, if the right to strike is to be protected, that
an insistence upon an abandonment of a strike as a condition prece-
dent to bargaining be considered an unfair labor practice. How-
ever, when a shift is made from a subject that is unlawful' as in
213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954). In Allis-Chalmers, the court stated the rule as it was
stated by the Supreme Court in Borg-Warner. However, the court did not apply the
rule in Allis-Chalmers since it held that a strike ballot and a contract ratilication
clause could be bargained about to the point of impasse. When Borg-Warner was at
the court of appeals, NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898
(6th Cir. 1956), the court noted the statement of the rule in Allis-Chalmers to the
effect that: "We are in accord with that ruling, without attempting to pass upon
the correctness of the Court's statement with respect to a situation where a pro-
posed clause is not within the statutory subjects of bargaining." Id. at 903.
17. Good faith is the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). See discussion below in text at notes 30-43
infra. Thus the Darlington case does not rest entirely upon the Borg-Warner rule.
18. 236 F.2d at 89.
19. 209 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1953).
20. Id. at 403.
21. The term "unlawful" refers both to subjects that are unlawful because they
violate express provisions of the NLRA and to subjects which, while not specifically
proscribed, are unlawful because they are contrary to the policy of the act. The
Pecheur case involves the latter type.
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1959] NOTES 1229
Pecheur, to a subject that is lawful2 as in Borg-Warner,23 the two
cases are clearly distinguishable and the rule stated in Pecheur is
no longer applicable. Therefore, it is clear that the Pecheur case
is not authority for the rule as applied in Borg-Warner. The other
cases cited in Darlington are similar in nature to Pecheur, and pro-
vide no better basis for the rule.24
The legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act, and
the American Insurance Case
The legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act
clearly demonstrates that the NLRB was not intended to control
the substantive terms of collective bargaining contracts. The act as
it was passed in the House, contained a section which specified and
limited the topics about which the parties would be allowed to bar-
gain collectively. 25 Concerning the provision, the House Report
contained the following statement:
22. In Borg-Warner, the Court stated: "This does not mean that bargaining is
to be confined to the statutory subjects. Each of the two controversial clauses is
lawful in itself. Each would be enforceable if agreed to by the unions. But it does
not follow that, because the company may propose these clauses, it can lawfully in-
sist upon them as a condition to any agreement." 356 U.S. at 349. (Emphasis added.)
23. Arguably the Court's discussion of the effect of the strike ballot indicates
that the Court believes the strike ballot subverts the policy of the act. This inter-
pretation leads to the result that subjects which subvert the policy of the act can
still be lawful subjects. Also, this interpretation of the Courts discussion would
ha-;e to be reconciled with the fact that Congress specifically provided for a strike
ballot in two situations. Labor Management Relations Act §§ 203(c), 209(b),
61 Stat. 154, 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 173(c), 179(b) (1952). For a further dis-
cussion see notes 57--63 infra and accompanying text.
24. NLRB v. Dalton TeL Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951); see discussion
at notes 13-15 supra. NLRB v. Aldora Mills, 180 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1950), en-
forcing mein. 79 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948); employer refused to sign a contract until
the certified bargaining representative chartered a local organization. NLRB v.
Corsicana Cotton Mills, 178 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1949); employer insisted that non-
union employees be permitted to vote upon the provisions of the contract nego-
tiated by the union. American Laundry Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 124 (6th
Cir. 1949), 76 N.L.R.B. 981 (1948); employer refused to bargain unless the union
withdrew unfair labor practice charges that had been filed with the Board and
discontinued a strike. NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.
1941); employer insisted that the union organize the rest of that industry; held to
be a violation of the employees' right to bargain collectively through a representa-
tive of their own choosing. Hartsell Mills Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 291 (4th Cir.
1940); employer refused to sign a written contract and made withdrawal of un-
fair labor practice charges a condition precedent to collective bargaining.
25. Such terms shall not be construed as requiring that either party...
discuss any subject matter other than the folloving: (i) wage rates, hours of
employment, and work requirements; (ii) procedures and practices relating
to discharge, suspension, lay-off, recall, seniority, and discipline, or to promo-
tion, demotion, transfer and assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii) con-
ditions, procedures, and practices governing safety, sanitation, and protection
of health at the place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence;
and (v) administrative and procedural provisions relating to the foregoing
subjects.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947).
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[T]he present Board has gone very far, in the guise of determining
whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself
up as the judge of what concessions an employer must make and of the
proposals and counterproposals that he may or may not make.20
When the bill went to the Senate, it was amended to eliminate the
section specifying the bargainable topics. The House Conference
Report commented:
[T]he Senate amendment, while it did no t prescribe a purely objective
test of what constituted collective bargaining, as did the House bill, had
to a very substantial extent the same effect as the House bill in this re-
gard, since it rejected, as a factor in determining good faith, the test of
maldng a concession and thus prevented the Board from determining the
merits of the positions of the parties.27
Thus the legislative intent is clear that the Board should not be
allowed to pass upon the merits of the substantive positions taken
by the parties in the process of collective bargaining. 8 Yet, in effect,
that is exactly what the Borg-Warner rule will allow the Board to
do through the guise of determining whether a particular provision
is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining."
In 1952, the Supreme Court decided NLRB v. American Nat'l
Ins. Co.,"0 which seemingly affirmed the interpretation of the legis-
lative history given above. American Insurance involved an em-
ployer that insisted to the point of impasse upon a management
functions clause which provided that the employer would be able
to unilaterally control many subjects that are usually determined by
collective bargaining.31 The Court held that this was not an unfair
labor practice, and in the course of the opinion stated:
Conceding that there is nothing unlawful in including a management
functions clause in a labor agreement, the Board would permit an em-
ployer to 'propose' such a clause. But the Board would forbid bargaining
for any such clause when the Union declines to accept the proposal .
26. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947).
27. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947).
28. The legislative history is not entirely unequivocal in that the act was partly
directed at the Board practice of requiring the employer to make a concession
in order to establish his good faith. But see the dissenting opinion in Borg-Warner,
356 U.S. at 354-57.
29. An example is Borg-Warner itself. The employer was held to have committed
an unfair labor practice hecause he took the position that the collective bargaining
contract should contain a strike ballot clause.
30. 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
31. The management functions clause involved in American Insurance provided:
The right to select, hire, to promote, demote, discharge, discipline for cause,
to maintain discipline and efficiency of employees, and to determine schedules
of work is the sole prerogative of the Company and the Company's decision
with respect to such matters shall never be the subject of arbitration.
343 U.S. at 397 n.2.
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The Board was not empowered so to disrupt collective bargaining prac-
tices....
Congress provided expressly that the Board should not pass upon the
desirability of the substantive terms of labor agreements. Whether a con-
tract should contain a clause fixing standards for such matters as work
scheduling or should provide for more flexible treatment of such matters
is an issue for determination across the bargaining table, not by the
Board.3 2
The Court in American Insurance apparently considered the man-
agement functions clause to be within the statutory definition of
collective bargaining. 3 To the Board's proposal that bargaining for
the management functions clause was a "per se" violation of the
act, 4 the Court replied: that the management functions clause was
not an illegal contract term; 5 that the management functions clause
was commonly found in collective bargaining contracts; that the
management functions clause is a condition of employment to be
settled by bargaining; 3 that fears that the management functions
clause will lead to an evasion of an employer's duty to bargain col-
lectively "do not justify condemning all bargaining for management
functions clauses"; 3 7 and that:
The duty to bargain collectively is to be enforced by application of the
good faith bargaining standards of Section 8(d) to the facts of each case
rather than by prohibiting all employers in every industry from bargaining
for management functions altogether.3 8
The Court did not discuss the effect that the management functions
clause would have upon collective bargaining as was done with the
strike ballot in Borg-Warner. It is interesting to note how well the
line of reasoning used in American Insurance could have been used
32. 3 U.S. at 408-09.
33. See 343 U.S. at 409. The Court also stated that the management functions
clause covers terms and conditions of employment. See Id. at 407.
34. Note that the Board's proposal in American Insurance was based on the rule
that was accepted by the Court in Borg-Warner.
35. In a footnote the Court stated that such cases as NLRB v. National Maritime
Union, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949), are not applicable. The National Maritime
case is smila in nature to the cases relied on in the Dalton case. See note 24 supra.
36. While the Court in American Insurance may have considered the manage-
ment functions clause to be a term and condition of employment, 343 U.S. at 409,
the Court may not have relied upon that as a basis for its decision.
37. 343 U.S. at 409. The Court evidently used the term "bargaining" to mean
insisting upon a proposal in the face of the union's rejection of it: " . . . the Board
would permit an employer to 'propose' such a clause. But the Board would forbid
bargaining for any such clause when the Union declines to accept the proposal..."
343 U.S. at 408. The meaning of "bargain" is not the same in Borg-Warner where,
the Court, while referring to voluntary subjects that cannot be insisted upon,
stated: " . . . each party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not
to agree." 356 U.S. at 349.
38. 343 U.S. at 409.
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in Borg-Warner to uphold the strike ballot as a term or condition
of employment.3 The only real difference between the two cases,
except for the difference in clauses themselves, is that in American
Insurance the employer was proposing the management functions
clause as a counterproposal to a union demand for unlimited arbitra-
tion,4" while in Borg-Warner the employer insisted upon the strike
ballot as a condition precedent to signing the collective bargaining
contract.41 This fact should not make any difference since one of
the stated purposes of the LMRA was to eliminate the counterpro-
posal test the Board had previously used as a test of good faith.42
Therefore, it would seem that the Court's position on the problem
presented in the two cases has shifted, since it probably could have
39. The Board had attempted to apply the same rule in both cases. The strike
ballot is not an illegal contract term; the strike ballot is commonly found In
collective bargaining contracts; the strike ballot is a condition of employent to be
settled by bargaining; all strike ballots should not be put outside the scope of
collective bargaining because of fears that a strike ballot will lead to an evasion of
an employer's duty to bargain collectively; and the duty to bargain Is to be on-
forced by the application of the good faith standard.
40. The dissent in American Insurance, written by Mr. Justice Minton with Mr.
Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas joining, disagrees with the majority on this
point:
No one suggests that an employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice when
it proposes that it be given unilateral control over certain working condi-
tions and the union accepts the proposal in return for various other benefits.
But where, as here, the employer tells the union that the only way to obtain a
contract as to wages is to agree not to bargain about certain other working
conditions, the employer has refused to bargain about those other working con-
ditions. There is more than a semantic difference between a proposal that the
union waive certain rights and a demand that the union give up those rights
as a condition precedent to enjoying other rights.
843 U.S. at 411-12. The dissent may just be disagreeing with the way the majority
read the record. However, it is worthy of note that Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Douglas are in the majority in Borg-Warner, and that the "condition prece-
dent" language appears in the opinion: " . . . it does not follow that, because the
company may propose these clauses, it can lawfully insist upon them as a condi-
tion to any agreement." 356 U.S. at 349. So Iong as this language Is applied to
subjects that are not terms and conditions of employment, no confusion Is created.
But if the assumption is made that the management functions clause is a term and
condition of employment, then we have at least two members of the Court that
would apply the "condition precedent" test to such provisions. The result of such
an application would be the necessity of distinguishing between a counterproposal
and a condition precedent.
41. Another possible distinction is that the company in American Insurance by
bargaining for the management functions clause which reserved terms and con-
ditions of employment to management was in effect bargaining about the terms
and conditions of employment included. On the other hand, it may be said that
the company in Borg-Warner was bargaining only about a procedural provision, a
procedural provision not coming within the statutory definition of collective bar-
gaining. But how can the strike ballot be differentiated, for example, from the
grievance procedure which is a procedural term?
42. Section 8(d) of the act provides: "but such obligation [to bargain col-
lectively] does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the mak-
ing of a concession." Labor Management Relations Act § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (19,17),
[Vol. 43:12251232
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disposed of Borg-Warner by merely citing American Insurance as
controlling.43
However, the management functions clause was considered to be
a term and condition of employment. American Insurance can be
narrowly interpreted to mean that the Board cannot control the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement as long as the subjects
are terms and conditions of employment. But the language of
American Insurance-is much broader, and Borg-Warner reaches a
result that is directly contrary to that clear language.
. II. ThiE. Borg-Warner RuLE: ITS EFFEcT ON THE PRACTCE
. OF CoLLEcTn BARcAiNiNc
The first effect.of the rule was .to create an additional category of
bargaining subjects. Prior to Borg-Warner there were two kinds of
bargaining subjects:: (1) illegal subjects-those expressly prohib-
ited by the NLRA or -any others that the courts found unlawful
because they were contrary to-the purposes of the act- which can-
,not be included in a collective bargaining contract; 4 4 and (2) man-
datory subjects-those that come within the definition "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" -which must
be bargained about in good faith, although neither party has to
accept themA5 Borg-Warner created a third category: voluntary
subjpts-those that -ma, be proposed and are lawful if the other
party agrees totheir inclusion in the collective bargaining contract
-which cannot be insisted upon to the point of impasse.4"
Asebond.effect, one whibh necessarily follows from the categori-
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952). The House Bill as it passed the House, proided:
"Such terms shall nbt be construed as requiring that either party . . . submit
counterproposals.?' H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947). The Senate
Report contained the following: "It should be noted that the word 'concession'
was used rather than" 'counterproposal' to meet an objection raised by the Chair-
man of thd Board to a 'orresponding provision in one of the early drafts of tho
bill." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947).
43. The trial- examiner 'did not find that the employer had bargained in "bad
faith." Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1955).
44. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952)
(comp;ny refused to deal with a particular person as bargaining representative for
the employees); NLRB v. George P. Pillig & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941)
(company demanded that the union organize the industry in general); International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 119 N.L.R.B. 1792 (1958) (union insisted upon
an inappropriate unit).
45. See, e.g., National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940) (discharge of
employees); NLRB v. Andrew Jergeas Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1949) (union
security); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948) (retirement
and pension plans).
46. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (strike
ballot); NLRB v. Darlington Veneer Co., 236 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1956) (auto-
matic nullification of collective bargaining contract and contract ratification by em-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1225
zation discussed above, is that each addition of a subject to the
voluntary category means there is one less subject in the mandatory
bargaining category. Heretofore, the area of collective bargaining
has been expanding. Subjects that were once thought to be within
the exclusive control of management are now admitted to be subjects
of mandatory collective bargaining. 47 However, under the Borg-
Warner rule, once the Board decides that a particular provision is
not within the statutory language defining collective bargaining, that
provision will be excluded from the scope of mandatory collective
bargaining until the Board changes its mind or is overruled. Assum-
ing that the scope of collective bargaining should be sufficiently
flexible to satisfy the needs of the various particular collective bar-
gaining situations, this restricting process is unfortunate. A subject
that is not a term or condition of employment in one industry, may,
because of different circumstances, be a term or condition of employ-
ment in another industry.48 After Borg-Warner, it is doubtful that a
party would chance insisting on a strike ballot provision, no matter
how appealing the facts may be toward the conclusion that it is a
term or condition of employment in their particular situation.I Cer-
ployees); NLRB v. Dalton Tel Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951) (requirement
that union register under state statute so as to make it an entity amenable to suit
in the state courts).
47. See, e.g., Morton, Limitations Upon the Scope of Collective Bargaining, 7
LAB. L.J. 603 (1956); Note, 50 Nw. U.L. iEv. 279 (1955). Of course, new sub-
jects may still be added to those already found to be mandatory, and more very
probably will be so added.
48. Probably the outstanding example of this situation involves company hous-
ing. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821 (4th Cir.
1953); NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 190 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1951).
In our opinion, the Company's contention that company houses are not a
proper subject of negotiation with a union representing the employees cannot
be sustained as a general proposition. In many mills such houses are a neces-
sary part of the enterprise and in this instance they were maintained by the
employer and rented at such rates to the employees as to represent a substan-
tial part of their remuneration. It follows that the subject is one in which the
employees have so great an interest in connection with their work that it
should be a subject of bargaining between the employer and the representatives
of the men.
Id. at 972. But see, NLRB v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953).
On this record, which fails to show that rentals are so low as to be partial
remuneration for services and, therefore, in effect, wages, or for any reason
save individual choice why one-third of the employees occupy company hous-
ing, we are unable to hold that the terms and conditions of such occupancy
are comprehended within the statute's designation of 'wages' or 'other condi-
tions of employment.
Id. at 38.
Also, note that part of the reason for the Court's refusal to adopt the Borg-Warner
rule in the earlier case of American Insurance was that the good faith test was to
be used " . . . rather than . . . prohibiting all employers in every Industry from
bargaining for management functions clauses altogether." 343 U.S. at 409.




tainly, the Court gave no indication in its opinion that a strike ballot
would be mandatory in some circumstances and voluntary in others;
in fact, its language was clearly all inclusive.50 Thus, the scope of
collective bargaining has already been restricted by the exclusion
of the strike ballot from the area of mandatory collective bargaining.
Third, the Borg-Warner rule will tend to subvert one of the basic
theories of the NLRA, the theory that by sitting down to a bargain-
ing table in an atmosphere of good faith bargaining, the parties will
be able to arrive at a solution that is agreeable to both parties with-
out resort to the various methods of industrial warfare."' The Borg-
Warner rule tends to remove some of the incentive to discuss fully
all the terms that might be raised by a party.5 2 Any voluntary sub-
jects that are raised by one party may be summarily dismissed by
the opposing party on the basis that it is not a subject that its
proponent may insist on. 3 Heretofore, the parties had to be careful
as to the good faith evidenced by the bargaining position they took
as to all provisions that were not clearly unlawful. In other words, a
party would not ordinarily flatly refuse to discuss a particular pro-
vision, because doing so would tend to give his bargaining position
an air of bad faith.54 Now, if a subject is considered voluntary, the
good faith requirement may well be inapplicable to that subject.15
Therefore, the theory of the NLRA was put into practical effect
50. The Court stated without equivocation that the ballot clause is not a
. . . subject within the phrase 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment' which defines mandatory bargaining." 356 U.S. at 349.
51. "[To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith." Labor Management Relations Act § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952). "The theory of the Act is that free opportunity
for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote
industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the
Act in itself does not attempt to compeL" NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). For an example of the actual functioning of the theory,
see Shell Oil Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 161 (1951) (union agreed to restrict the member-
ship of the grievance committee to include only employees).
52. This result seems to have been envisioned by the Court in Borg-Warner
when it stated: "The duty [to bargain] is limited to those subjects, and within
that area neither party is legally obligated to yield... As to other matters, how-
ever, each party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree.
356 U.S. at 349. The second sentence would seem to lead to the conclusion that
the opponent of a suggested provision that is not within the statutory definition
of collective bargaining need not even discuss it.
53. There is a possibility that under certain circumstances a party may be able
to summarily refuse to bargain about a subject even if it is a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining. See Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HI-w.
L. REV. 1401, 1412 (1958).
54. See, e.g., NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1953);
Wheatland Elec. Co-op. v. NLRB, 208 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1953); Majure v.
NLRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
55. See notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text.
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in that the parties discussed all of the lawful provisions that were
raised, so that the opposing party might either see the reasonable-
ness of a proposal or that he could use the proposal as a quid pro
quo for one of his own.
A fourth effect of the Borg-Warner rule is that until a certain
subject has been placed in the voluntary category, by Board or
court decision, a party to a collective bargaining relationship will
not know until too late whether a certain subject matter will fall
within that category. For example, the Borg-Warner management
learned that it had committed an unfair labor practice, even though
it had bargained about the strike ballot in good faith. What guide
does Borg-Warner give as to when a certain subject will be found
to be voluntary? The Court, in holding the strike ballot to be volum-
tary, stated:
[T]be issue here is whether... the 'ballot' . . . clause is a subject within
the phrase 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment'
which defines mandatory bargaining. [It] . .. is not within that definition.
It relates only to the procedure to be followed by the employees among
themselves before their representative may call a strike or refuse a final
offer. It settles no term or condition of employment -it merely calls for
an advisory vote of the employees. It is not a partial 'no-strike' clause.
A 'no-strike' clause prohibits the employees from striking during the life
of the contract. It regulates the relations between the employer and the
employees. . . .The 'ballot' clause, on the other hand, deals only with
relations between the employees and their unions. It substantially modifies
the collective-bargaining system provided for in the statute by weakening
the independence of the 'representative' chosen by the employees. It
enables the employer, in effect, to deal with its employees rather than
with their statutory representative. Cf. Medo Photo Corp. v. Labor Board,
321 U.S. 678.56
Probably the key guide is whether or not the provision in question
"substantially modifies the collective-bargaining system provided
for in the statute." However, this guide will be almost impossible
to apply, except in an extremely clear case. For example, it is diffi-
cult to grasp why the strike ballot modifies the collective bargaining
system provided for in the statute any more substantially than
does the no-strike clause or the management functiqns clause.5 T
Perhaps the Court's distinction, to be of value, cannot be divorced
from the clause of the Court's opinion, " . . . by weakening the in-
dependence of the 'representative' chosen by the employees." 8
56. 356 U.S. at 349-50.
57. Both the no-strike clause and the management functions clause are manda-
tory subjects of collective bargaining. See note 58 infra.
58. The implication of the Court's statement is that the representative chosen
by the employees is supposed to be independent of the employees it represents.
But this does not necessarily conform with the legislative history of the NLRA.
Rather, one of the purposes of the act was to assure that employees could join
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Certainly that is so for the strike ballot in Borg-Warner. However,
this would make the guide of limited application. The remainder
of ihe Court's statement provides other criteria and distinguishing
features that may be useful in determining whether a provision
is mandatory or voluntary, although the Court certainly did not
assert each to be an individual test. Perhaps, as in Borg-Warner,
all of them must be met. The criteria are that a provision may be
voluntary if it relates only to the procedure to be followed by
the employees among themselves;59 if it does not settle a term or
independent unions instead of the company dominated unions that had become
prevalent. See, e.g., 78 CoNG. REc. 3443, 3679, 12041 (1934) (remarks of Sena-
tor Wagner. The strike ballot would in no way affect the independence of the
union from the company;. it would merely make the union more dependent upon
the desires of the union members. On the other hand, the strike ballot would
weaken the independence of the union from the employees it represents. However,
that result may be beneficial; perhaps much of the current trouble with corrupt
and irresponsible unions is a result of the unions being too independent of the men
they represent.
Also, there is little question that the strike ballot would weaken the independ-
ence. of the union to direct and control the employees without consideration of the
employer's "needs. However, limiting of this type of union independence is one of
the employer's purpbses when he- sits down with the union representatives to
bargain. collectively. If weakening this type of independence was the test for
deciding whether a particular provision is a term or -condition of employment,
many -of the recognized mandatory objects of collective bargaining would not
come .within tha.phrase "terms and conditions of employment." For example, griev-
ance procedure and arbitration clauses, though usually sought by unions, limit
the union's independence in that they set up a procedure for settling disputes. A
management functions clause limits- a union's independence by removing certain
subjects- from union consideration. A no-strike clause limits a union's independence
to call a strike. All of these clauses are mandatory subjects. See, e.g., Hughes Tool
Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945) (grievance procedure); NLRB v. Boss
Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir- 1941) (arbitration clause); NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (management functions clause); Shell Oil
Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948) (no-strike clause).
Perhaps Congress intended that employees be allowed to actually participate in
the affairs of the labor organization representing them. And perhaps the strike
ballot is merely a device for allowing the employees to do so. The act provides: "It
is the purpose and policy of this chapter . . . to protect the rights of individual
employees in their relations with labor organizations," and a 'labor organization"
is "any organization . . . in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose . . . of dealing with employers .... " Labor Management Relations Act
§§ 1, 2(5), 61 Stat. 136, 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141(b), 152(5) (1952). Add
to this the fact that the act specifically provides for strike ballots in two situations,
Labor Management Relations Act §§ 203(c), 209(b), 61 Stat. 154, 156 (19-17),
29 U.S.C. §§ 173(c), 179(b) (1952), and the conclusion can be reached that
Congress intended the strike ballot to be a term or condition of employment vell
within the collective bargaining system provided for in the statute.
. 59. Arguably, the ballot clause does not relate "only to the procedure to be
followed by the employees among themselves before their representatives may
call a strike or refuse a final offer." First, it does not set up a procedure that
must be followed prior to all strikes. It merely deals with economic strikes, so that,
should an employer commit an unfair labor practice, the union would be free to
call a strike immediately without having to conduct a strike ballot. See Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1955) (no-strike clause did not waive
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condition of employment; 60 if it deals only with relations between
the employee's right to strike against unfair labor practice). But see, Mid-West
Metallic Products Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 42 L.R.R.M. 1552 (1958) (employees
violating no-strike clause limiting right to strike for period necessary to complete
the grievance procedure, about 5 days, in protest against an unfair labor practice
may be discharged). This case was specifically limited to Its facts. 42 L.R.R.M.
at 1555.
Second, to say that the ballot clause relates "only to the procedure to be followcd
by the employees among themselves" is a gross over-simplification. The existence of
a strike ballot clause in a collective bargaining contract also Influences the pro-
cedures that the union and the employer follow. In order to avoid an adverse
vote, the union must convince the employees that more can be gained by going
on strike than by accepting the employer's offer, and vice-versa with the eployer.
The attempt by employer and union to win the employees to their respective view-
points was envisioned by the House Committee when It reported on H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947), which contained a strike ballot.
[Alt least the more irresponsible strikes, those called without due considera-
tion, those concerning small issues, and those that leaders call without consult-
ing their constituents, will be greatly reduced by requiring strike votes after
each side has had an opportunity to state its position and to urge Its fairness
upon those called upon to do the striking.
H.R. RLP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947).
Also, the employer may be able to tailor his offer more to the needs of his em-
ployees, rather than to the demands of the union which may have other motives
than the welfare of the particular employees for which the union is bargaining.
This situation is most likely to occur in the area of labor racketeering. See, e.g.,
BuREAu oF NATIONAL ATAmns, TnE McCrEsAN CoMrrn-r= HAmnn s - 1957,
at 326 (1958). However, a union's nonrepresentation of the desires of its members
also occurs outside the area of labor racketeering. See, e.g., WEmne, UmNo Dr-
cisiN-MAx.ic ix CoLLzcvE BAucAaNr. (1951). The author distinguishes three
elements, "the 'union,' the leadership, and the rank and file membership." Id. at 6.
[Tihe goals of the three elements involved in trade unionism are often at
variance with each other. . . . A union shop clause, giving a higher degree of
security to the 'union' may be obtained only at the sacrifice of an immediate
wage increase that would accrue to the rank and file.
Id. at 8. See also the remarks of Representative Hartley in discussing the Labor
Management Relations Act, 93 CoNe. Rec. 3425 (1947), and those of Senator Ball,
id. at 4432.
60. But what test is to be used to see whether a subject "settles" a term or
condition of employment? The cases have not been clear. Partially responsible for
this lack of clarity is the difficulty of analogizing from one provision to another,
once the controversy leaves the area of wages and hours. Courts have rejected the
argument that the statutory definition should be restricted to the historical sub-
jects of collective bargaining. See, e.g., NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d
713 (2d Cir. 1952) (christmas gifts); W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875
(1st Cir. 1949) (group insurance program). However, courts have considered the
fact that a certain provision is often included in collective bargaining contracts
as a factor in determining whether a provision is a term or condition of employ-
ment. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 405-07 (1952)
(management functions clause), Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374
(7th Cir. 1954). Another possible test that courts have suggested is that the em-
ployer must bargain about "all matters which affect his employees as a class."
See, e.g., NLRB v. Barrett Co., 135 F.2d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1943); NLRB v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1943) (cases Involving
conduct of a party to a collective bargaining relationship). Still another test some
courts use is whether the provision would be an inducement for an employee to
accept a fob with the company that had the provision instead of a company that
did not. See, e.g., Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
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the employees and their unions; 61 and, if it enables the employer
to deal with its employees rather than with their statutory repre-
sentative. 62 Again, these criteria would be inapplicable in many
situations in which the parties are attempting to determine whether
or not a particular provision is mandatory. Also, assuming that the
tests are applicable, their application would be extremely difficult.
For example, assuming that these were the existing rules before
denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956) (employee stock purchase plan). But no test has
been used extensively. Application of any of the above tests to the strike ballot
would lead to the conclusion that the strike ballot is a term or condition of em-
ployment. To the extent that the ballot clause limits strikes it certainly "settles"
a condition of employment. And the ado"o strike ballot may tend to eliminate
strikes by making the union more hesitant to call a strike should the employees
vote to accept the employer's offer. This seems especially so since the strike to en-
force union bargaining demands would be an economic strike, as distinguished from
an unfair labor practice strike. In the former, the employer can hire replacements
without having to give jobs back to the old employees when the strike is over;
in the latter he cannot. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc. 229 F.2d 391
(8th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Jackson Press, Inc., 201 F.2d 541 (7th Cr. 1953).
61. Arguably, the ballot clause deals with more than just the relations between
the employees and their unions. It also deals with the relations between the em-
ployer and his employees. The way in which the employer has treated his em-
ployees in the past, and the reasonableness of his final offer may influence their
vote. Since the ballot clause in Borg-Warner would have prohibted the employees
from striking for 72 hours immediately subsequent to the employer's submisson
of his final offer, it regulates for that 72 hours the relations between the employer
and his ernlyee in he same way that a no-strike c aus de. in fact, it is ag-
able that although there are differences between a no-strike clause and a baot
clause, they cannot be distinguished. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in
Borg-Warner:
S]ince a 'no-strike' clause is something about which an employer can con-
cededly bargain to the point of insistence... I find it difficult to understand
even under the Court's analysis of this problem why the 'ballot clause should
not be considered within the area of bargaining described in § 8(d). It affects
the employer-employee relationship in much the same way, in that it may
determine the timing of strikes or even whether a strike will occur by re-
quiring a vote to ascertain the employees' sentiment prior to the union's decision.
356 U.S. at 35. The court of appeals in Borg-Warner had decided that the strike
ballot was within the statutory definition of collective bargaining. 236 F.2d 898
(6th Cir. 1956). It is interesting to note that Mr. justice Burton, the author of the
majority opinion in Borg-Warner, has since retired; and that Mr. Justice Stewart,
his replacement, was one of the three judges on the court of appeals deciding
Borg-Warner.
62. The ballot clause does allow the employer to deal to a limited extent with
the employees rather than with the statutory bargaining representative, but only
if the union agrees, as of course it need not, to allow the employer to submit his
final offer to the employees for a strike ballot. But even after a union agrees to a
strike ballot the employer would not be able to deal with the employees via the
offer and counteroffer that constitutes collective bargaining. He would still have to
deal primarily with the union, for he has to try to reach a satisfactory final proposal
with them. And only after the point of impasse has been reached does the em-
ployer "in effect," deal with his employees, that is, they are allowed to vote
whether or not to strike. The Court cited Medo-Photo Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678 (1944), which involved an employer who made his offers and proposals di-
rectly to his employees, and in so doing bypassed the union. The situation created
by a strike ballot clause is clearly distinguishable.
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the Borg-Warner case was decided, and that no case had yet ap-
plied them to the strike ballot, a strong argument could be made
that the strike ballot does not violate the criteria. 3
Fifth, the rule will reduce, insofar as nonmandatory subjects are
concerned, the advantage a party in a strong bargaining position
has over a weaker opponent. In this respect, the rule of the instant
case seems to create a contradictory situation. Referring to subjects
that are not within the statutory definition of collective bargaining,
the Court stated that: "each party is free to bargain or not to bar-
gain, and to agree or not to agree."0 4 However, as the dissent pointed
out:
... I am unable to grasp a concept of 'bargaining' which enables one to
.propose' a particular point, but not to 'insist' on it as a condition to
agreement. The right to bargain becomes illusory if one is not free to
press a proposal in good faith to the point of insistence. 5
For all practical purposes, a party will not be able to bargain about
a subject that is not within the statutory definition of collective
bargaining. 6 If a party cannot insist to the point of impasse, the
other party need neither seriously consider the proposal nor suffer
the consequences.,of coming away. from the bargaining table with-
out a collective bargaining contract, with the result that there may
be no inducement to bargain about the proposal whatsoever.
However, it is arguable, contrary to the dissenters' position, that
the right to bargain becomes illusory when the parties are allowed
to press a proposal to the point of insistence. Then the party in the
stronger bargaining position can insist that the opposing party ac-
cept its conditions whether or not they are within the statutory
definition of collective bargaining, and the weaker party is quite
often not in a position to refuse without suffering serious economic
consequences. 7 Under these circumstances, the right to bargain is
indeed illusory. Therefore, the Borg-Warner rule should tend to
remove the collective bargaining relationship slightly from the
use of the threat of industrial warfare by limiting the provisions
that can be insisted upon by the parties.
Sixth, the rule will create practical procedural and decisional dif-
ficulties for both the Board and the courts. Prior to the adoption
63. See notes 59-62 supra.
64. 356 U.S. at 349.
65. Id. at 352.
66. This, of course, depends upon the definition of "bargaining." It would seem
that a proponent could get his opponent to accept almost any particular provision
if he offered the opponent enough in return.
67. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REc. 3834 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); 93 CONG.
REc. 5014 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball); BuxruAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Tim
MCCLELLAN COMMIrrEE HEIuNcs- 1957, at 218-21 (1958); DAUHERITY &
P uusH, THE: LABoR PROBLEMS Or AMEnICAN SoCIETY 395-405 (1952).
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of the new rule, the determination whether an unfair labor prac-
tice had been committed in the process of collective bargaining
was relatively simple. If the proposal that was being contested was
not unlawful or in derogation of the policies of the act, and if the
party had bargainied in good faith, there was no unfair labor prac-
tice. Under the new rule, the procedure will be much more in-
volved. The Board must also decide whether the challenged objec-
tive comes within the statutory definition of collective bargaining.
If it does, the inquiry is ended since the proponent is allowed to in-
sist on it to the point of impasse. On the other hand, if the
objective is not within that definition, but rather within the penum-
bral area of voluntary subjects, the next question is whether the
proponent has driven the collective bargaining relationship to an
impasse by insisting upon the provision too long. Here the Board
will have to weigh many factors. It must first decide how long a
party can insist without creating an impasse; surely this is not
measurable by days or number of bargaining sessions." And yet,
unless a set standard is established, the parties involved in such a
situation will have no means of knowing at what point an impasse
is reached. Therefore, the Board may have to set definite standards
in terms of time or number of bargaining sessions.a The Board
must also decide whether the parties are required to pass over
the objectionable provision and discuss the other provisions of the
contract, or whether an impasse can be reached when only the one
provision has been discussed. The Borg-Warner rule may also affect
the good faith rule. A literal reading of the statute does not indi-
cate that a party must bargain in good faith about voluntary sub-
jects.70 Indeed, a party need not bargain about a voluntary sub-
ject at all, but if there is bargaining about one, fine distinctions will
have to be drawn, in particular situations, as to whether "bad faith"
bargaining over that subject relates only to it or to the entire pro-
posed collective bargaining agreement. Bad faith bargaining over a
68. Borg-Warner involved an employer that insisted upon the strike ballot as a
condition of agreement. Possibly the case can be limited to those situations where a
party is insisting upon a voluntary subject as a condition of agreement. However,
it is submitted that there is no practical difference between insisting upon a pro-
posal as a condition of agreement and insisting upon it as a counterproposal
69. It is interesting to note that since the introduction of H.R. 3020, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947), we have traveled a complete circle. H.R. 3020, con-
tained a provision specifying what subjects could be bargained about. The Senate
amendments eliminated the provision. The specified provisions are now back. The
same thing may happen to the number of meetings that the parties must hold in an
attempt to arrive at a contract.
70. The statute provides that the parties must meet and confer in good faith with
respect to mandatory subjects. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(d), 61 Stat.
142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952). There is an implication that the parties
do not have to meet and confer in good faith about subjects that are not mandatory.
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voluntary subject could be deemed refusal to bargain in good
faith on the other provisions of the proposed agreement.71 Finally
the Board may have to lay down a test for deciding what consti-
tutes a term and condition of employment so that when a new term
is raised by a party to a collective bargaining relationship, there is
some bench mark with which to compare it. These are some of the
problems that the Board or courts will probably have to resolve so
that the parties in a collective bargaining relationship will know
how to conduct themselves.
IV. CONCLUSION
While it is arguable that the Borg-Warner rule cannot be recon-
ciled with the legislative history of the labor acts, that the prior
cases do not support the rule, that the rule violates some of the
policies of the act, and that the rule raises a great many difficult
problems, it is also arguable that the policy that collective bargain-
ing be conducted at the bargaining table with as little use of the
threat of industrial warfare as possible will be more nearly realized
by the use of the Borg-Warner rule. Therefore, the question be-
comes one of balancing the various factors in an attempt to achieve
the "best" result. Probably the Court formulated the new rule be-
cause it found the good faith standard did not place the parties
on as near equal terms as possible at the bargaining table. Possibly
the Court felt that it needed a device to prevent the stronger party
in the collective bargaining relationship from forcing provisions
on the other party that would act to eliminate his effectiveness.
This new rule allows the Board and the courts to place these types
of subjects in the voluntary category. Perhaps the new rule will
raise a great many problems as yet unthought of that may make
its application impractical. Perhaps the parties will be able to
"bend" the new rule to serve their own purposes in ways that may
necessitate returning to the single standard of good faith. But most
of this is speculation. Whether the Court's apparent aim, to fur-
ther approach the ideal that industrial disputes should be settled
by bargaining without resort to industrial warfare, will be accom-
plished is a question that can be answered only after experience
under the new rule has accumulated. Only then can the Borg-
Warner rule be appraised in the light of its actual effect on the
parties in the collective bargaining relationship.
71. A possible example of this situation might be: The employer proposes a
voluntary subject, the union accepts it, using the voluntary subject as a quid pro
quo to attain a desired objective. Bargaining proceeds, and all of the terms of the
contract are agreed to. At this point the union refuses to execute the contract unless
the voluntary provision is deleted from it. Had the subject in question been a man-
datory subject, such bargaining would probably constitute an unfair labor
practice.
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